The 20th annual Symposium will be held on Thursday, April 23, 2009.

Party Regimes and the Politics of Regulation: Why the Free Market is not Truly Free
Norris 102, 2:30 PM

Eric  Schroeder,   '09 52
   Major: Political Science
   Hometown: Tecumseh, MI

Sponsor(s): Alfred Pheley, Andrew Grossman, Bill Rose
Support:  

Abstract: 
There are many ways to look at how the American state developed throughout U.S. history. One way to look at state building is through political party regimes, a theory by political scientist Stephen Skowronek, where one political party holds power at all levels of government over a long period of time. In my research, I have taken Skowronek’s work a step further by applying it to certain forms of public policy. When looking at government regulatory policies, I have noticed a pattern in American history where the government goes through long periods of either regulating or deregulating certain industries and their respected markets. Many scholars believe the reasons why the government decides to regulate or deregulate is based on the demands of the free market, however my research offers an opposing theory. I will argue that it is the work of party regimes and their ideologies that ultimately determine why government decides to increase or decrease its regulation of certain industries. I will use several case studies involving government regulatory policies in the railroad, airline, and other transportation industries in order to show how government has changed its stance on regulation over time and then link these changes to Skowronek’s timeline of “realigning elections” to show the role party regimes play in this process. Ultimately, my work will not only provide proof of the existence of party regimes but also raise some questions about whether the “free market” is truly free.

 52